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Abstract
The empirical analysis of media platforms economics has often neglected the multi-homing
behaviour of advertisers. Assuming away the cross-substitutability and/or complementarity
between the advertising slots of dierent platforms could damage the quality and the robustness
of counterfactual analysis. To evaluate the consequence of such an abstraction, we compare
the simulation results of hypothetical platform mergers when the demand on the advertising
side is derived from a Translog cost model which allows for multi-homing, and when it is
approximated by using a simple log-linear inverse demand model that ignores the dierentiation
among media platforms' advertising slots. Ignoring the existence of substitutes or complements
on the advertising side would result in overpredicting the losses of the viewers' surplus and in
underpredicting the gains in platforms' revenues.
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1 Introduction
Recent studies on equilibrium models of advertising-nanced media platforms based on the eco-
nomics of two-sided markets have contributed to the understanding of the theory of harm raised
by mergers in platform industries and the measurement of its eects. Simulating the outcomes of
a change in platform ownership given the estimated preferences and costs relies crucially on the
precise estimation of the demand patterns of viewers and advertisers.
This paper comments on a practical challenge in the simulation of media platform mergers
that arises from the multi-homing behaviour of advertisers. Since the latter decides on how many
advertising minutes to buy and often combine the advertising slots of several media platforms
to reach the desired amount of audience, their choice of platforms is not discrete. Therefore,
we cannot rely on a discrete choice model to estimate the substitutability or complementarity
between advertising platforms. As a matter of fact, this issue has been neglected in the literature.
Often the demand model of advertisers has been approximated a log-linear model that relates the
logarithm of advert prices of a given platform to the logarithm of its own advert quantities and
audience. While it is easy to implement, this approach assumes away the substitutability and/or
complementarity between the advertising slots of dierent platforms. Not only such an abstraction
is not realistic, but it certainly could deteriorate the quality and the robustness of predictions based
on this model, like the outcomes of merger simulation.
Ivaldi and Zhang (2020, IZ2020 in what follows) proposes an alternative framework in which
the advertisers' decision program consists in minimizing the total advertising costs to reach a
given level of audience. This framework can be implemented by approximating the true cost
function of advertisers by a Translog cost function, which allows to explicitly estimate the own- and
cross- price elasticities of demand for dierent advertising platforms. The Translog cost function
has two nice features: First, it does not impose any substitution patterns between advertising
platforms, which is consistent with the multi-homing behaviour of advertisers. Second, it can be
easily estimated even with a large number of competing platforms. Nevertheless, this approach
complexies the procedure to simulate a change of policy such as a platform merger as it requires
to solve sequentially two systems of equations. Indeed, a media platform, which raises revenues
from selling time slots for advertisements, faces a trade-o between the preferences of viewers and
the objectives of advertisers: The advertisers wish to reach a large audience while the viewers could
be negatively aected by the amount of advertising. Such a media platform must internalize the
network externalities between the viewers and the advertisers in order to maximize its prot. This
feature should be taken into account in the merger simulation procedure. It implies in practice to
nd the prot maximizing level of advertising prices as a function of the corresponding demand for
advertising. A simplied model for advertisers' demand ignoring the cross-elasticities of demand on
the advertising side allows one to derive directly a closed form solution for a channel's advertising
price as a function of its amount of advertisement. However, a more comprehensive model such as
the proposed Translog cost function requires to solve a non-linear system of equations in order to
obtain the demand for advertising slots of one channel as a function of the advertising prices of all
channels of the market.1
In this paper, we assess the relevance of such a complex simulation model. Using the same
data as in IZ2020, we simulate the outcomes of two hypothetical platform mergers (between two
substitutable advertising sales houses (ASHs) and between two complementary ones), when we
approximates the demand on the advertising side, rst by using the the Translog model proposed
in IZ2020, and then by using a simple log-linear inverse demand model. Our results, comparing
the simulated merger eects using the two alternative demand models for advertisers, suggest that
1The procedure to simulate a platform merger is detailed in IZ2020.
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one always over-predict the increase in total amount of advertising (accordingly, under-predict the
increase in average advertising prices) when one neglects the substitutability or complementarity
between the merging ASHs. In other words, ignoring the existence of substitutes or complements on
the advertising side during the simulation of a platform merger would result in over-predicting the
loss of the viewers' surplus and in under-predicting the gain in platforms' revenues. The magnitude
of such discrepancies in the simulated merger eects is more important when it concerns a merger
between two substitutable ASHs.
2 Data
We use data on the French digital TV market to perform the merger simulations. Our sample is
the same as the one that has been used in IZ2020. The reader is referred to that paper for more
details on the construction of dataset.
Dierent to IZ2020 in which we perform merger evaluation using post-merger data between 2011
and 2013, herein, we use data between 2008 and 2010 to simulate the outcome of two hypothetical
mergers. Our goal is to highlight the consequence of ignoring the advertisers' cross-elasticities of
demand when simulating the potential impacts of a merger, and comment on how the results dier
depending on whether the merging platforms are complements or substitutes for the advertisers.
We observe a signicant change in broadcasting quality of some TV channels after 2010, which
could interfere with the simulated merger eects. Therefore, we prefer to restrict our simulation
sample to data before Jan. 2010.
3 Demand primitives and merger simulation
On the audience side, we use directly the model of preferences of TV viewers estimated in IZ2020.
The viewers' demand is approximated by a nested-logit model, which classies the choices of the
TV viewers into g groups of TV channels and an additional group for the outside goods. The TV
viewers' demand function to be estimated is given by ln sjt− ln s0t = αAjt+σ ln sjt/g+Xjtβ+ ξjt,
where sjt denotes the market share of channel j on audience side, sjt/g denotes the market share
of channel j within its group and s0t denotes the market shares of the outside goods. Xjt is
a matrix of variables including observed content characteristics, channel-xed eects, as well as
month- and year-xed eects. Ajt refers to the amount of advertising on channel j during period
t. The estimate of parameter α, which measures the utility of advertising for viewers, is negative,
suggesting that the advertisers generate negative cross-side externalities for viewers.
On the advertising side, we keep the choice model of advertisers based on the estimation
of a Translog cost function presented in IZ2020. The cost share equations to be estimated is
SAjt = γj +
∑J




jt denotes the advertising cost share of channel j
in period t, pjt denotes the per minute advertising price and Yt =
∑J
j yjt is the total number of TV
viewers with yjt refering to audience of channel j. The parameter γij measures the Allen partial
elasticities of substitution between dierent input factors (i.e, the advertising slots of dierent
channels).
For comparaison, we also estimate a simplied demand model for advertisers. We will refer to
this later model as the inverse demand function in what follows. It ignores the cross-elasticities
of demand of advertisers as it tries to explain the advertising price of a media platform j by its
own amount of advertising and its own viewership, controlling for some exogeneous variables. It
is specied as ln pjt = γ lnAjt + θ ln yjt + X
A
jtB




month- and year- xed eects.2
We estimate this inverse demand function model using the two-stage least squares estimator,
since both the logarithm of advert quantities lnAjt and the logarithm of audience ln yjt could be
endogenous. Indeed, the error term ξAjt is likely to include unobserved programming quality which
might be correlated with both lnAjt and ln yjt.
We use the total broadcasting hours of news and entertainment of competing channels to
instrument the variables lnAjt and ln yjt. The validity of this set of instruments relies on a timing
assumption: Neither ASHs nor advertisers observe the error term ξAjt until TV channels have
selected the broadcasting content (news and entertainment); the selection of content does not
depend on the unobserved characteristics included in ξAjt. This assumption is met in the French
digital TV market. First, a TV channel obtains the broadcasting right of a content via contract
with its producer, many content producers require the TV stations to pre-purchase and to commit
on the broadcasting of its content already at the production stage, via a co-nancing system.
Second, national broadcast TV stations in France have the duty and some obligations to ensure
the diversity of content that they oer; these channels need to agree with the sector regulator CSA
on the amounts and schedules of news and entertainment content that they plan to oer at the
beginning of every year.3
The estimated value of parameter γ̂ is equal to −0.392 and the one of parameter θ̂ is equal
to 0.909. Both are signicantly dierent from zero at the 5% level. These estimates are used to
perform the merger simulations below. Note that the inverse demand function allow us to derive
an analytical expression of advertising price pjt as a function of the amount of advertsing Ajt and




The merger simulations are performed using the rst order condition (FOC) associated with
the prot maximization program of advertising sales house (ASH) of channel j. At equilibrium,
the amount of advertising is the variable which links both sides of the market: It has an impact
both on the number of viewers and the advertising prices of the TV channels. An ASH internalizes
the network externalities between viewers and advertisers by choosing the amount of advertising














Ajt. The FOCs associated with











) = 0 (1), where
cjt denotes the estimated marginal cost of selling one minute of advertising, H is the advertising
sales house of channel k.













): The ASH of channel j internalizes the impact of the channel j's advertising level on
the sales of advertising slots of channel k, after merging with the ASH of channel k. The simulation
procedure consists of nding the vector At = {A1t, ..., AJt} which solves the new equilibrium
described by the FOC (1).
2This model has been used in Rysman (2004) and Fan (2013) to evaluate the impact of platform entry and of
merger.




Simulation with inverse demand function on the advertising side
A logit type demand model for TV viewers allows one to derive an analytical expression of audience
yjt as a function of the vector of advertising levels of dierent TV channels, namely, yjt ≡ F (At).
Substituting it in the inverse demand function for advertisers, one obtains the following relationship
between channel j's advertising price pjt and the advertising levels of dierent TV channels At =
{A1t, ..., AJt}: pjt ≡ G (Ajt, yjt(At)) (2). One can next substitute this equation (2) into the FOC
(1) and nd the vector At = {A1t, ..., AJt} which solves the new equilibrium. The simulation
procedure implied by this model is straightforward but it assumes away the direct eect of the
advertising price of another channel k 6= j on the demand for advertising slot of channel j.
Simulation with Translog cost function on the advertising side
Alternatively, the Translog cost function proposed in IZ2020 implies a more complex relationship







i γij ln pit+ θj(lnYt) (3), where Yt =
∑J
j yjt. This model takes into account
the direct eect of the advertising price of channel k 6= j on the demand for advertising slot of
channel j, as the advertisers can substitute or complement an advertising slot of channel j by the
advertising slot of another channel k. The equilibrium advertising levels of dierent channels At
can be found via a xed point iteration: At = N (pt(At), Yt(At)), where pt = {p1t, ..., pJt}.
In practice, nding a vector At which solves the FOC of the prot maximizing problem of
an ASH, and satises the demand function of advertisers given by their Translog cost function,
requires to solve sequentially the two systems of equations given by (1) and (3). This gives one
more step of complexication compares to the case where the demand of advertising is modelled
according to an inverse demand function.
We compare now the merger simulation outcomes given by the two alternative models of advertisers
demand to assess the relevance of a more complex simulation procedure considering explicitly the
cross-elasticities of demand of advertisers.
4 Results
We simulate separately the eects of a merger between two substitutable advertising sales houses
(ASHs) and between two complementary ones. The simulated merger eects are presented in
Table 1 and Table 2.
Table 1 shows the simulated impact of mergers on the equilibrium level of advertising quantities
and prices. We rst note that the merger between two (either complementary or substitutable)
ASHs increases the market equilibrium amount of advertising, which is due to the substitutional
eects on the viewers' side. Indeed, the fact that advertisers generate negative cross-side exter-
nalities to viewers implies that a merged ASH has incentivize to increase its advertising level, as
it internalizes the negative externalities of advertising. The other ASHs increase their amount of
advertising as well as a stratergic response to the choice of the merged ones.
Now, without accounting for the advertisers' cross-elasticities of demand (i.e., using the inverse
demand function), we predict a decrease in the advertising prices of the merging ASHs, even for the
case in which the two merged ASHs are substitutes for advertisers. In fact, the log-linear inverse
demand function implies that the advertising prices of a channel j, pjt, decreases in response to the
increase in its amount of advertising Ajt. However, this result is counterintuitive and contradictory
with the basis theory of harm of merger analysis.
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Table 1: Simulated merger eects on advertising quantities and prices
% changes in advert quantity % changes in advert price
of merging ASHs of non-merging ASHs of merging ASHs of non-merging ASHs
Merging Two Substitutable ASHs
Translog cost function 1.14 5.08 40.06 21.99
Inverse demand function 17.31 9.00 −13.99 0.32
Merging Two Complementary ASHs
Translog cost function 1.92 2.00 −0.42 1.46
Inverse demand function 5.40 1.21 −1.69 0.39
Table 2: Simulated welfare eects of merger
% changes in % changes in % changes in
viewers surplus total advert cost total prot of ASHs
Merging Two Substitutable ASHs
Translog cost function −0.13 30.65 67.02
Inverse demand function −3.13 2.85 −21.64
Merging Two Complementary ASHs
Translog cost function −0.11 0.70 1.21
Inverse demand function −0.25 0.41 −1.16
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We obtain more intuitive results with the Translog cost specication which considers explicitly
the advertisers' cross-elasticities of demand. A merged ASH internalizes not only the substitutional
eects on the viewers side but also the substitutional and/or complementary eect on the adver-
tisers' side. Merging two ASHs, which are substitutable for advertisers, intuitively increases the
advertising prices, as the merged entity internalizes the pricing externalities. Merging two ASHs,
which are complementary for advertisers, has much less signicant impact at equilibrium. This is
because the complementarity between the merging rms eliminate their pricing externalities. If
the merged ASH increases the advertising price of one of its channel j, the marginal advertisers
would not switch to another channel under its management which is complementary to channel j,
but to the other channels that are substitutes for these channels. The prices for the complementary
advertising slots are lower under joint ownership rather than independent ownership.
Accordingly, while ignoring the advertisers' cross-elasticities of demand in the merger simula-
tion, we over-predict the increase in the market equilibrium level of advertising quantities. For
the case in which the merged ASHs are substitutes for advertisers, we furthermore miss-predict
the impact of merger on the advertising prices without considering the cross-substitutional eects
on the advertising side. Hence, using a simplied model which ignores the substitutability or the
complementarity of media platform for advertisers when one simulates the eect of mergers be-
tween two ASHs is inappropriate, as such a simplied model assumes away an important feature
of the two-sided market, namely, the platform internalizes the cross-externalities between the two
groups of consumers (viewers and advertisers). Knowing that too much advertising reduces a me-
dia platform's audience (because advertisers generate negative externalities to viewers), which will
in turn decrease the willingness to pay of advertisers (as viewers generate positive externalities to
advertisers), a platform merger should not increase signciantly the market equilibirum amount of
advertising. Especially, for the case in which the merged platforms are substitutes for advertisers,
the merged rm has even more incentive to not loss audience with more advertising, since it could
charge higher prices to the advertisers. Overall, when it comes to the magnitude of discrepancy
between the predicted merger eects using the two alternative models for advertisers' demand,
we note that, ignoring the advertisers' cross-elasticities of demand is more problematic when the
simulated merger concerns two substitutable ASHs for advertisers than when it deals with two
complementary ones.
Table 2 shows the simulated welfare impacts of the mergers. While ignoring the cross-elasticities
of demand of advertisers, we over-predict the loss of viewers' surplus due to the over-predicted
increase in advertising quantities. In regard to the total advertising costs, we under-predict the loss
of advertisers due to the under-predicted increase in advertising prices. Ignoring the advertisers'
cross-elasticities of demand impact the magnitude of change in the prots of ASHs as well. Indeed,
we would conclude that the total prot of ASHs is lower in a more concentrated advertising market
(following a merger between two ASHs). We obtain more intuitive results once taken into account
the advertisers' cross-elasticities of demand in the merger simulation, in which case we exhibit an
increase in the total prot of ASHs.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we highlight the consequences of ignoring the existence of substitutes or comple-
mentes in one side of the market when evaluating the platform mergers. More specically, we
assess the relevance of taking into account the advertisers' cross-elasticities of demand in the sim-
ulation of merger between ASHs. We compare the simulation results using two alternative models
of demand of advertisers. We show that ignoring substitutability or complementarity between
dierent ASHs results in over-predicting the loss in the viewers' surplus, and in under-predicting
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the gains in the total prots of ASHs. The magnitude of discrepancies is more important when
simulating a merger between two substitutable ASHs. We believe our results are useful for policy
makers seeking to regulate the concentration of platform markets.
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